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An effective (e.g., honest, trusting, and informed) attorney-client 
relationship is required for adolescents to properly assist counsel in their 
own defense.  These relationships require (a) an understanding of the 
advocacy role of the attorney, and (b) a sense of trust that the attorney 
will work diligently to defend and protect their client.  However, younger 
adolescents struggle to understand the advocacy role of defense 
attorneys and tend to misunderstand attorney-client privilege.  Although 
parents may be thought of as compensating for their children’s lack of 
knowledge and experience, it is not clear whether parents themselves 
understand the lawyer’s role and how the lawyer may interact differently 
with parents and youthful clients.  We review the empirical literature on 
youth understanding of the attorney-client relationship, particularly for 
public defenders and court-appointed counsel.  We also report results 
from an empirical study of parents’ and youths’ understanding of 
lawyers, including age-based differences in expectations of attorney 
behavior.  We discuss the implications for policy and practice for 
individual lawyers who represent youth as well as the justice system 
more generally. 
 
I. THE NEED FOR REPRESENTATION IN JUVENILE COURT 
 
The way the United States handles juvenile defendants has changed 
dramatically within the last century.  At its inception in 1899, juvenile court 
hearings were handled informally: with social workers and probation officers 
rather than attorneys, judges deciding instead of juries, and no perceived need for 
due process.
1
  The court intended to act as a benevolent parent, viewing the 
juvenile’s presenting offense as a mere symptom of larger problems, usually 
attributed to the family, which could be addressed by an intervention approach 
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consistent with a medical model of curing a disease.
2
  This approach afforded the 
court wide discretion to dispense individualized justice that was tailored to the 
specific needs of a youth, and his family, rather than a standardized response to a 
particular offense. 
In what has become known as the “due process” era of juvenile justice, a 
series of Supreme Court cases in the 1960’s acknowledged that the promise of 
benevolent, effective intervention was not regularly achieved.
3
  Instead, as Justice 
Fortas wrote in Kent v. United States,
4
 juveniles in court received the “worst of 
both worlds”—none of the care and intervention promised by the original court 
and none of the due process protections afforded adult clients who faced 
punishment in the criminal justice system.  One of the major changes to the early 
court provided juveniles with the rights to counsel, avoid self-incrimination, 
receive adequate notice of charges, and confront witnesses at hearings.
5
  In the 
landmark decision In re Gault, the Supreme Court determined the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also affords juvenile defendants the right to 
effective counsel.
6
  Moreover, a number of state codes explicitly guarantee 
juveniles the right to counsel in juvenile court.
7
 
In the wake of a third wave of juvenile justice reform that introduced harsher 
punishments, determinate sentencing, and increased avenues for transferring youth 
to criminal court,
8
 Levick and Desai outline three reasons why juveniles need to be 
represented by counsel throughout court processing, not just the adjudication 
hearing.
9
  First, accumulating research documents the incomplete development of 
important cognitive and psychosocial capacities that directly bear on youth 
decision-making generally, and decision-making as defendants specifically.
10
  
Second, counsel can assist the court in keeping treatment and rehabilitation, the 
original cornerstones of the court’s approach to delinquency, as a priority.11  
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Finally, the attorney’s advocacy can temper the quantity and quality of 
punitiveness that came to characterize juvenile court proceedings during the latter 
part of the 20th century.
12
  
Of the changes afforded by Gault, the right to counsel is arguably one of the 
most important.
13
  The foundation of an effective relationship between an attorney 
and her client is built on communication and trust.  Clients must trust their attorney 
to be competent legal advocates, while attorneys should trust that their clients are 
providing relevant and accurate information.  The client must trust that their 
attorney is fighting for the best outcome in court in order for the client to feel 
secure sharing private, and potentially incriminating, information with their 
attorney.  At its core, the relationship exists to address a legal problem for the 
client.
14
 
In this paper we investigate the effectiveness of this critically important 
relationship between the juvenile client and her attorney.  We begin by examining 
two important characteristics that distinguish the juvenile-attorney relationship 
from that of adult clients—juveniles’ developmental capacities and the role of 
parents.  We then briefly describe various models of representation that respond in 
different ways to these unique characteristics of the juvenile client.  Next, we turn 
in greater detail to the three main challenges that derive from these unique 
characteristics.  First, we examine research on youths’ capacities to understand the 
attorney’s role, to appreciate the nature of the attorney-client relationship, and to 
trust that attorney’s commitment to treat the client fairly.  Then, we focus on 
parents, presenting original data from our study of 170 parent-youth pairs about 
those same capacities in parents as well as how parents view their own role in the 
decisions their adolescents make while working with attorneys.  Finally, we review 
how a high demand for public defenders combined with inadequate funding for 
indigent defense serves as a hindrance to building rapport with younger defendants 
who may require more time and attention to build an effective attorney-client 
relationship. 
 
II. TWO KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN JUVENILE AND ADULT CLIENTS 
 
Generally, the legal system acknowledges that juveniles do not have the same 
rights and responsibilities as adults.  As dependent minors, juveniles are unable to 
make legally binding decisions in almost any circumstance, including entering 
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contracts, getting married without parental consent, or voting.
15
  The justice 
system, however, is one of the few contexts in which juveniles are expected to 
function as autonomous, competent legal actors who understand, appreciate, and 
assert their constitutional rights.  Although the justifications for this legal 
framework vary,
16
 developmental differences play a key role. 
 
A. Ongoing Cognitive and Psychosocial Development 
 
Advances in brain science over the past twenty-five years have expanded our 
understanding of the developing structure and function of the brain.  Combined 
with decades of behavioral research, our more nuanced understanding of 
adolescence indicates important cognitive and psychosocial capacities relevant to 
their status as defendants are still developing.  Brain imaging studies document 
that both structural and functional changes in the brain continue during 
adolescence and into young adulthood.
17
 
Research on psychosocial maturity has focused on several components of 
judgment and decision making that are particularly relevant for juveniles’ capacity 
to function effectively as defendants.  Studies indicate that adolescents, particularly 
younger adolescents, are less able than adults to understand risks and benefits, to 
identify and weigh future consequences against short-term effects, to resist the 
influence of peers, to delay gratification, and more.
18
  Presumably, these capacities 
for executive functioning, or self-regulation, mature over the course of adolescence 
and continue developing well into young adulthood, or emerging adulthood.
19
  
In addition to their underdeveloped capacities, youths are less able than adults 
to make effective decisions in immediate emotional circumstances (“hot”) 
compared with more delayed, less emotional conditions (“cool”).  For example, 
Figner and colleagues used a type of card game to test adolescents’ proclivity to 
take risks under more and less emotionally laden circumstances (e.g., “hot” and 
“cool” conditions).20  In the “hot condition,” participants played one card at a time 
and ended the round when they were satisfied with the points gained or when they 
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turned over a losing card.
21
  Importantly, immediately after each round in the hot 
condition, participants received information about average gain, loss, and the 
number of loss cards remaining in the deck.
22
  Unbeknownst to the players, the hot 
condition was rigged so the first few decisions resulted in a points gain, reinforcing 
the decision to keep turning over cards.
23
  In contrast, the cool context minimized 
emotion and time pressures by asking participants to decide how many total cards 
they wanted rather than deciding one card at a time, and also by delaying feedback 
until the end of the entire game.
24
  In both hot and cool conditions, the more cards 
turned over, the more risk was being taken.
25
  Their findings revealed that children, 
adolescents, and adults turned over similar amounts of cards in cool conditions.
26
  
However, adolescents turned over significantly more cards (i.e., took more risks) 
than the other groups in the hot or affective condition.
27
 
Although just one example, these results are consistent with adolescents’ 
well-documented proclivity for engaging in risky behaviors compared to adults,
28
 
which are thought to “reward” a youth through excitement, material possessions, 
and peer approval, among other things.  If risks are taken successfully, the 
possibility of negative consequences such as physical harm or legal accountability 
may seem remote and unlikely.  Moreover, adolescents’ capacities to regulate their 
own behavior are more easily overwhelmed by emotional, affective conditions that 
are likely even more common outside the laboratory setting.
29
 
It is important to note that some adults demonstrate “immature” development 
in a number of these capacities too.
30
  The important difference here is that 
adolescents as a group are likely to demonstrate these deficits because of their age, 
not just because of individual differences in personality or preference.  For some 
adolescents, those differences will remain into adulthood, but the majority of youth 
will grow out of those deficits into mature individuals.  Compared to adults, 
juveniles’ immature psychosocial capacities mean they are more prone to risky 
behavior, more likely to discount future consequences in favor of immediate 
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consequences, more susceptible to peer pressure, and more likely to be affected by 
emotionally laden, time pressured, stressful circumstances.  
 
B. Roles and Responsibilities of Parents 
 
Another key difference between adolescents and adults is the role of parents.  
American legal philosophy holds that parents are in the best position to make 
decisions in the best interests of their children.  Children are assumed to be 
incompetent to make decisions and, because of their vulnerability to the influence 
of others, dependent on the care of adults.
31
  Parents are the adults who are 
accorded both the rights and responsibilities to raise their children as they see fit, 
within some broad parameters that protect children’s safety and well-being 
justified through the states’ parens patriae authority.32  For the most part, the law 
does not differentiate adolescence from childhood or adulthood.
33
  Adolescents 
require parental consent for most decisions ranging from the serious (e.g., getting 
married) to the mundane decisions (e.g., attending a school field trip).  Parents are 
the ultimate arbiter of virtually all aspects of an adolescent’s life and usually will 
be familiar with the child’s capacities and tendencies.  
Although stereotypes about the “storm and stress” of adolescence emphasize 
conflict with and disengagement from parents and increasing influence of peers, 
disagreements between parents and adolescents are relatively common but serious 
conflict is relatively rare.
34
  The rates of parent-adolescent disagreement decline 
throughout adolescence, but the negativity increases during early adolescence and 
does not decline significantly.
35
  Adolescence brings increases in several aspects of 
autonomy including cognitive autonomy (i.e., thoughts and values), emotional 
autonomy (i.e., emotional regulation, own sense of maturity), and behavioral 
autonomy (i.e., independent control and regulation of behavior).
36
  Most families 
are able to negotiate changes in authority and relationships successfully as 
adolescents mature, but a minority of families do not.
37
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III. MODELS OF REPRESENTING THE JUVENILE CLIENT 
 
The attorney is faced in many ways with a more complicated and demanding 
relationship with a juvenile client compared to an adult client.  The youth acts 
simultaneously as a defendant who can assert or waive constitutional rights, an 
adolescent who is still developing important psychosocial and self-regulation 
capacities, and a child embedded in a family and subject to their care and control 
(in theory).  The attorney simultaneously acts as an adult who must communicate 
complex legal concepts to an adolescent, a lawyer bound to advocate for a client’s 
wishes that may undermine the client’s best interests, and a member of a court 
system that operates through formal and informal culture, pressures, and rules. 
Since Gault, attorneys’ relationships with juveniles have transitioned from an 
initially more paternalistic model (i.e., best interests) to more of a legal advocacy 
role (i.e., expressed interest model).
38
  Professor Henning examined the possible 
models for the attorney-client relationship when the client is a juvenile, describing 
the range of approaches on a continuum from a best-interests model to an 
expressed-interests model.
39
  A traditional best-interests model acknowledges the 
ongoing development of youth and allows the attorney to make decisions on behalf 
of that still-maturing client.
40
  Henning also describes the possibility of a “parent-
directed best-interest” model in which the parents make key decisions and guide 
the attorney’s advocacy for her juvenile client.41  Professor Henning notes that this 
approach is consistent with the general deference to parental authority for children 
that we described earlier.  A third type of model is the substituted judgment 
doctrine in which the attorney attempts to discern the juvenile’s wishes and, 
combined with information obtained from other sources when needed, makes 
decisions about the case.
42
  Each of these doctrines relies in part on questionable 
assumptions about youth, parents, and attorneys that we address later in the paper.  
The traditional model of legal representation, which Henning describes as 
“expressed-interest,” places the lawyer in the position of advocating the desires 
and decisions of her juvenile client.  Within this client-directed model, attorneys 
could exert significant influence and control (the “authoritarian” model), remain 
non-directive but provide the necessary information for clients to make their own 
decisions (the “client-centered counseling” model), or scaffold the client’s decision 
making with information and advice that create a process for good decision making 
(the “collaborative” model).43  Henning concludes that the collaborative model is 
best suited to adapt to the developmental capacities of youth as well as the role of 
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parents while maintaining the youth’s ultimate decision-making authority.44  
Therefore, juveniles are being advised by counsel but ultimately are responsible for 
making their own legal decisions and instructing their attorneys on how to move 
forward and which goals and objectives to prioritize.  
 
IV. CHALLENGES TO AN EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY-JUVENILE CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
 
Whether or not juvenile defendants as a class are capable of entering into an 
effective attorney-client relationship is an empirical question.  Do adolescents 
understand the role of the defense attorney and other legal actors involved in their 
case?  Do adolescents’ prior beliefs about the justice system facilitate an 
understanding of privilege?  Are adolescents’ decision-making capacities 
sufficiently developed to facilitate the attorney-client relationship?  What role, if 
any, might parents play in their adolescent’s legal decisions?  Ultimately, these 
questions all examine the concept of whether or not adolescents can effectively 
assist with their defense.  
The Supreme Court has outlined what is legally required for the attorney-
client relationship to be effective as an essential part of due process.  According to 
Dusky,
45
 a defendant must be able to factually understand the charges and the 
significance of the charges against them, and must be able to consult with counsel 
about those charges throughout the course of their case.  This standard suggests the 
defendant must be able to provide counsel with any information and assistance 
needed in order to proceed with adjudication.
46
  Therefore, a defendant should (1) 
understand the role of counsel, (2) trust that the attorney is working for them as 
their advocate, (3) understand and appreciate the concept of attorney-client 
privilege, and (4) understand the consequences of having and not having assistance 
from counsel.  Being competent to stand trial requires a juvenile client to be able to 
work alongside their attorneys in order to assist in their own defense.  The 
assumptions being made by the Supreme Court beg the question of whether 
juveniles are competent legal actors who factually understand and can appreciate 
the role of counsel as well as assist counsel in their own defense.  Although Dusky 
concerned an adult defendant and some scholars and advocates question whether 
adjudication in juvenile court requires a Dusky-level of competence,
47
 the Dusky 
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framework has been extended to juvenile court jurisdiction in many states.
48
  Here 
we are less concerned with the debate over a juvenile court standard than with the 
capacities of youth to engage competently and effectively with an attorney 
regardless of court jurisdiction.
49
 
As we will review in greater detail, research on whether juveniles understand 
and appreciate the attorney’s role has indicated that younger adolescents in 
particular seem to be at risk of misunderstanding.  Specifically, younger 
adolescents struggle to understand the advocacy role of defense attorneys and tend 
to misunderstand attorney-client privilege.  For example, research has shown that 
compared to only 6% of adults, almost 30% of juveniles surveyed believed that 
their attorney worked for the juvenile court,
50
 a fact that can impede the attorney-
client relationship by undermining trust.  Additionally, other research has shown 
that juveniles misunderstand attorney-client privilege, such that adolescents are 
more likely than adults to believe their attorney can tell judges or police officers 
what was discussed during private attorney-client conversations.
51
  Finally, lessons 
from developmental science suggest that adolescents’ capacities related to 
competence to stand trial are normatively underdeveloped compared to adults, 
leading adolescents to struggle with judgment and legal decision-making.
52
  
Therefore, as a class, juveniles are not only more likely than adults to struggle with 
factual misunderstandings and beliefs regarding counsel, but they also struggle to 
appreciate the long-term consequences of their legal decisions and instructions for 
counsel.
53
  This group is likely less able than adults to assist counsel effectively in 
their own defense without deliberate efforts to assist them, such as the 
collaborative approach to representation.
54
 
Of course, the attorney-client relationship doesn’t develop in a vacuum but in 
a larger developmental and social context.
55
  Adolescents’ decisions do not occur 
without input from other actors, and their misunderstandings and beliefs are likely 
partially influenced by those actors as well.  For example, most adolescents live 
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with a parent, parents, or a legal guardian.  That family unit lives within a larger 
societal context influenced by laws, policies, and beliefs about the justice system.  
This is true for the attorney as well.  Attorneys may be working with high 
caseloads or client loads and inadequate funding,
56
 which may result in less time 
spent building rapport with their clients.  Given their potential for 
misunderstandings, time to build trust is particularly important for juvenile clients.  
In fact, according to the recommendations set out by the UNLV Conference on 
Representing Children in Families, attorneys should dedicate approximately one-
hour to solely building rapport with their juvenile client.
57
  In order to understand 
the unique circumstances of an effective relationship between an attorney and her 
juvenile client, we must account for the (a) developmental challenges (e.g., 
capacities to function effectively as defendants), (b) contextual challenges (e.g., the 
role of parents), and the (c) structural or systemic challenges (e.g., inadequate 
resources for indigent defense of juveniles). 
 
A. Developmental Capacities to Function Effectively in the Attorney-Client 
Relationship 
 
In this section, we briefly review the empirical literature on youths’ capacities 
relevant to the attorney-client relationship.  First, we review research examining 
age differences in factual understanding and appreciation of the justice system 
process generally and the role of the attorney specifically.  We examine both 
factual information about attorneys and beliefs about the functions that they 
perform (e.g., the difference between not knowing what the term defense attorney 
means and believing the defense attorney is someone who takes on an adversarial 
role in your case).  We then examine age-based differences in perceptions of 
fairness and trust in attorneys. 
Much of the research on adolescents’ factual and functional capacities as 
defendants is framed by the legal construct of competence to stand trial in criminal 
court.  Also known as adjudicative competence, competence to stand trial refers to 
an individual’s ability to participate as a trial defendant and to aid their attorney in 
their defense (e.g., being able to consult with your attorney, understanding the 
charges brought against you).
58
  Adjudicative competence is legally required in 
order to try a defendant in criminal court because an individual must have 
“sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding and . . . a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
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proceedings against him.”59  In other words, individuals must be able to participate 
in their own defense and understand the consequences of pleading guilty when, 
among other things, the outcome may result in a loss of liberty.
60
  Defendants 
cannot be tried if they are found incompetent to stand trial and action must be 
taken to restore competence in order to continue pursuing charges against that 
person.  According to the Dusky criteria for competence to stand trial, attorneys 
must be able to communicate with their clients about the case and the client must 
be able to understand the proceedings against her.
61
  Defendants must have a 
factual and rational understanding of the charges (and implications) against them 
as well as an ability to assist counsel.
62
  For example, among other things, 
defendants must (a) be aware of the charges against them (and options for 
pleading) as well as the possible outcomes associated with those charges (i.e., 
sentences), (b) have an understanding of the implications or significance of the 
proceedings (e.g., not only know they have the right to a trial but also the 
implications of waiving that right), (c) understand the attorney’s role and be able to 
communicate adequately with the attorney, and (d) be able to make rational 
informed decisions about pleading and waiver of rights.
63
  Developmental 
incompetence, which refers to a lack of adjudicative competence that is as a result 
of normative cognitive and/or psychosocial immaturity,
64
 impedes the attorney-
client relationship and the defendant’s ability to assist counsel in their own 
defense.  
 
B. Age-based Deficits in Knowledge About Court Process and Attorney’s Role 
 
Significant age-based differences in competence-related capacities have been 
documented in multiple samples of justice-involved youth
65
 and by attorneys 
reporting on youth clients.
66
  Age-based differences cannot be explained away by 
justice experience; they are developmentally normative.
67
  As one example, Grisso 
                                                                                                                                      
59  Id. 
60  Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process, and 
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and colleagues examined capacities relevant to competence to stand trial in 
adolescents and young adults with and without justice-system experience.
68
  
Approximately 1,400 individuals (aged 11–24) from four different states across the 
United States (i.e., California, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Virginia) were assessed 
on intellectual ability (WASI), mental health (MAYSI-2), capacities relevant to 
competence to stand trial (MacCAT-CA), and judgment and legal decision-making 
(MacJEN).
69
  Unlike many other studies that solely looked at the cognitive 
capacities relevant to competence to stand trial (CST), this study also tested 
hypotheses that adolescents’ immature psychosocial capacities (e.g., influence of 
peers and authority figures, valuation of short vs. long-term consequences) would 
predict their decision-making in legal contexts.  
Adolescents, particularly young (11–13) and middle adolescents (14–15), 
differed from young adults (18–24) in three important ways.  First, the two 
youngest adolescent groups performed worse than older adolescents (16–17) and 
young adults on the competence capacity assessment, with one-third to one-quarter 
scoring comparably to samples of mentally ill adults found incompetent to stand 
trial.
70
  It is important to note that 16–17 year-olds did not differ significantly from 
young adults on this particular assessment.
71
  Second, although low IQ impaired 
participants’ capacities regardless of age or justice system experience, the 
impairment was greater for adolescents than young adults.
72
  Third, adolescents as 
a class (ages 11–17) had less mature psychosocial capacities (e.g., risk preference, 
future orientation) and made different decisions in legal vignettes (e.g., policy 
interrogation, plea agreement) than young adults; those decisions were predicted in 
part by psychosocial maturity levels.  Specifically, adolescents were more likely 
than adults to make decisions that complied with authority figures in the vignettes 
(e.g., accepting pleas or confessing to police) and were less likely to consider the 
risks and future consequences of their decisions.
73
  None of these age-based 
differences varied by race, ethnicity, gender, or socioeconomic status.   
Youths’ misunderstanding of the role of defense counsel can also lead to 
inaccurate beliefs regarding confidentiality and the advocacy role of the attorney.
74
  
                                                                                                                                      
68  Grisso et al., supra note 52. 
69  Id. at 337–41. 
70  Id. at 343–44, 356.  
71  Id. at 343.  
72  Id. at 346–50.  
73  Id. at 357. 
74  See Michele Peterson-Badali & Rona Abramovitch, Children’s Knowledge of the Legal 
System: Are they Competent to Instruct Legal Counsel?, 34 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 139 (1992); 
Christine S. Pierce & Stanley Brodsky, Trust and Understanding in the Attorney-Juvenile 
Relationship, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89 (2002); Melinda G. Schmidt et al., Effectiveness of 
Participation as a Defendant: The Attorney-Juvenile Client Relationship, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 175 
(2003); Viljoen et al., supra note 66. 
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In an early study, between one-quarter and a one-third of the juveniles sampled 
(28%), compared to only 6% of adults, believed that the defense attorney would 
advocate for their juvenile clients only if they believed they were innocent.
75
  In 
some cases, these juveniles believed that the attorneys would have to report to the 
juvenile court if the juvenile admits guilt.
76
  They may have understood that the 
role of the attorney is to provide an advocacy role to the defendant, but they did 
not realize that this was true regardless of actual guilt or innocence.  Some studies 
show that a substantial proportion of adolescents also believe defense attorneys can 
share information with police, judges, and parents without the juvenile’s consent.77  
Researchers interviewed approximately 200 individuals between the ages of 10 and 
23 on the role of the attorney and the notion of confidentiality between the attorney 
and their client.
78
  Eighty percent of young adolescents (13 and younger) and 56% 
of middle adolescents (ages 14–16) believed the attorney could share information 
with their parents.
79
  Similarly, about 70% of young adolescents and 44% of 
middle adolescents believed the defense attorney could share information with the 
judge.
80
  Finally, about 50% of young adolescents and 25% of middle adolescents 
believed confidential attorney-client discussions could be shared with police.
81
  A 
more recent study of approximately 150 males ages 12–20 suggests that although 
even more adolescents understand discussions cannot be shared with police 
(~90%), adolescents continue to struggle with the notion of confidentiality with 
regard to parents and judges.
82
 
Juveniles are likely to experience misunderstandings about the justice system 
because of cognitive immaturity and limited experience, but also because of 
misinformation and assumptions that are untrue.  This lack of understanding could 
hinder rapport building between attorneys and their juvenile clients.  Some of the 
research reviewed suggests that as age increases, so does the understanding of the 
roles of defense attorneys and the rules they must adhere to.  However, the same 
evidence suggests that even older adolescents struggle with understanding the 
advocacy role and confidentiality rules attorneys must abide by. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
75  Grisso, supra note 50, at 1158. 
76  Id. at 1158 n.91. 
77  Peterson-Badali & Abramovitch, supra note 74, at 150–52.  
78  Id.   
79  Id. at 151.  
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C. Mistrust, Unfairness, and Race  
 
To establish an effective working relationship with her attorney, a client must 
not only accurately understand the attorney’s role, but trust the attorney to 
represent and advocate for her accurately and fairly.
83
  Developed with adults, 
theories of procedural justice or “the justice of the decision-making process,”84 
have also been used to examine juvenile experiences with legal counsel.
85
  Tyler 
proposes four procedural components that affect individuals’ assessments of the 
justice system process: participation or voice (individuals’ opportunities to raise 
their opinions or suggestions on how to resolve personal problems), neutrality 
(having an impartial resolution from unbiased authority figures), trustworthiness, 
and treatment with dignity and respect.
86
  If individuals believe that their 
experience with the legal system was procedurally just, they are more likely to be 
satisfied with their experience and more likely to accept the outcome, even if that 
outcome (distributive justice) is not entirely favorable for them.
87
 
Trust in legal authorities may be particularly important to adolescents and 
their relationships with legal system officials.
88
  Adolescence is described as an 
important time of “legal socialization,” when interactions with authorities 
instantiate a view of the legitimacy of legal officials and the degree to which 
adolescents are likely to comply with laws and cooperate with authorities.
89
  
Experiences in juvenile court can be an important source of legal socialization for 
                                                                                                                                      
83  Henning, supra note 13, at 272–73; Michele LaVigne & Gregory Van Rybroek, “He Got in 
My Face so I Shot Him”: How Defendants’ Language Impairments Impair Attorney-Client 
Relationships, 17 CUNY L. REV. 69, 100–02 (2013). 
84  Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 119 
(2000). 
85  Michele Peterson-Badali et al., Young People’s Perceptions and Experiences of the 
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86  Tyler, supra note 84, at 121.  
87  See Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of Their 
Courtroom Experiences, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51 (1984); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural 
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REV. 103 (1988). 
88  See Henning, supra note 13, at 272 n.123; Tom R. Tyler, Why Trust Matters with Juveniles, 
85 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY S93 (2015); Emily Buss, “You’re My What?” The Problem of 
Children’s Misperceptions of Their Lawyers’ Roles, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699 (1996).  
89  See Jeffrey Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents, 18 
SOC. JUST. RES. 217 (2005).  See generally June Louin Tapp & Felicia J. Levine, Legal Socialization: 
Strategies for an Ethical Legality, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4–9, 17 (1974) (discussing that, as children 
age, their understanding about the law generally evolves from viewing laws as simple rules devised 
by authority figures to conceptualizing law as a series of complicated social agreements); Alex R. 
Piquero et al., Developmental Trajectories of Legal Socialization Among Serious Adolescent 
Offenders, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267 (2005). 
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both youth and their parents.
90
  Youth may be even more concerned than adults 
about “fairness.”91  Grisso theorized that adolescents’ reduced trust in attorneys 
also could be a function of their developmental stage (e.g., questioning authorities 
and adults), their experience with attorneys (e.g., some attorneys do not work well 
with juvenile clients), or some combination of the two.
92
  Moreover, research also 
documents the expressive and receptive language difficulties among many youth 
involved in the justice system.
93
  Youths’ linguistic capacities to communicate with 
their attorney can create additional challenges to establishing an effective 
relationship.  
Peterson-Badali, Care, and Broeking hypothesized that juveniles’ perceptions 
of how much voice they had, how likely they were to be treated equally as others, 
how trustworthy they found their attorney to be, and whether or not they were 
treated with respect would influence their level of satisfaction with their attorney.
94
  
They also hypothesized that satisfaction would be influenced by these four 
components (procedural justice) more so than case outcomes (distributive justice).  
They interviewed 48 pretrial or presentencing adolescent offenders in the Toronto 
area about their perceptions and evaluations of their lawyers and the lawyer-client 
exchange.
95
  The outcome of the case did not influence satisfaction with the 
attorney.  Instead, the four components of procedural justice were all positively 
related with attorney satisfaction; assessments of how objective, trustworthy, and 
respectful their lawyers most strongly predicted satisfaction.  Those juveniles who 
reported being dissatisfied were overwhelmingly dissatisfied because they felt their 
lawyer lacked respect for them or were unresponsive (e.g., the lawyer didn’t listen 
to the client or fight for what the client asked for).
96
  Clients who were satisfied 
with their attorneys felt that their lawyer was a competent legal advocate and 
respected them.
97
  Perhaps most telling, youths’ satisfaction with their attorney had 
nothing to do with the outcome of their case, but rather, with how well and how 
fairly they felt they were treated by their attorney.
98
  By discounting the juvenile 
clients’ wants and treating them with disrespect, attorneys decreased their juvenile 
                                                                                                                                      
90  Liana J. Pennington, Engaging Parents as a Legitimacy-Building Approach in Juvenile 
Delinquency Court, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 481 (2012).  
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(2008). 
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98  Id. at 391–92. 
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clients’ satisfaction and likely undermined trust in the relationship.   
Our discussion of trust and unfairness with juvenile clients would be 
incomplete without also considering race and ethnicity.  For example, Pierce and 
Brodsky interviewed 163 detained males between the ages of 12 and 20 about their 
understanding of lawyers and their trust in their lawyers.
99
  The main factors that 
led to distrust in their study were race and IQ.
100
  More specifically, an interaction 
between race and IQ predicted differing levels of distrust, such that young white 
men with higher IQs were more trusting of their defense attorneys than young 
white men with lower IQs.
101
  This, the authors hypothesized, was likely due to the 
misunderstandings that exist regarding the roles of defense counsel.  However, this 
relationship was reversed for young black men.
102
  Young black men with higher 
IQs were less trusting of defense attorneys, whereas young black men with lower 
IQs were more trusting of their attorneys.
103
  Schmidt, Reppucci & Woolard found 
that compared to other groups, African Americans were significantly less likely to 
“speak positively” about having trust in their defense attorney.104  Woolard and 
colleagues found that age and race combined to predict anticipatory injustice, or 
how much unfairness adolescents and adults expected to experience in the justice 
system.
105
  When asked to compare themselves to others in the justice system, 
older African American adolescents and young adults were more likely to 
anticipate unfair treatment and greater punishment than younger African 
Americans.
106
  Each study speculated that race-based expectations of unfairness 
and mistrust could be quite reasonable due to the racial inequities African 
Americans face in our justice system.  
Buss argues that the very nature of the court structure and process renders 
youths’ active participation as almost irrelevant, with a series of adults (including 
the youth’s attorney) speaking about the youth but not to or with the youth.107  
“But also of concern, and related to this exclusion, is the message that the entire 
court full of professionals, including the young person’s own lawyer and even 
more significantly the judge, are on a single team that excludes the young 
person.”108  
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Henning outlines potential practical implications of cognitive limitations and 
lack of trust on the juvenile-attorney relationship, including a greater likelihood of 
withholding information because the youth doesn’t trust the attorney, or doesn’t 
understand what information might be relevant to an effective defense.
109
  These 
studies highlight the importance of paying attention to a juvenile client’s needs, 
providing information in understandable formats, and treating them with respect.  
Without this focus on developing a sense of respect and rapport with the juvenile 
client, particularly minority juvenile clients, it is likely these clients will be at a 
disadvantage within the attorney-client relationship.  Youth don’t know what they 
don’t know and, for developmental reasons, may have fewer opportunities to 
figure that out. 
 
V. PARENTS AS CONTEXTUAL CHALLENGE AND/OR OPPORTUNITY:  
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 
 
The role of parents complicates court processing for juvenile defendants in 
juvenile court in ways that criminal defendants simply do not face.  Although 
attorneys are not legally required to have any involvement with the juvenile’s 
parents,
110
 it is unrealistic to assume that the attorney-juvenile client relationship 
happens absent any parental involvement or influence.  Some states have tried to 
facilitate the parent as advocate model by requiring parental presence or the 
presence of an interested adult for a child to make a valid waiver decision.
111
 
Parents may be thought of as compensating for their children’s lack of 
knowledge and experience; however, it is not clear whether parents themselves 
understand the legal processes, the lawyer’s role, or how a parent’s relationship to 
their child’s lawyer differs from the child’s.  Defense attorneys in one exploratory 
interview study reported that some parents enabled their youth to better understand 
the legal process, but that other parents provided inaccurate information and advice 
to their children or were unable to provide support and assistance because of their 
own poor functioning or language barriers.
112
  It is also unclear if the parent can 
maintain an advocacy role when factors such as restitution are included during 
disposition.  Restitution, for example, is technically part of the child’s disposition, 
yet it is expected that the parent is responsible for paying fines and therefore may 
not be impartial when advising their child.  For example, in our example above, the 
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child may want to go to court but the parent may be concerned that restitution 
charges will be higher if the child doesn’t accept the plea offered.  The ultimate 
conclusion is that it depends; some parents have the knowledge and capacity to 
help their children but others do not, and it is not entirely apparent what predicts 
those differences. 
Assuming the parent has an accurate understanding of the attorney’s role, they 
may be able to encourage their child to be open and honest with the defense 
attorney and in turn may serve as an “interpreter” between the attorney and the 
child given their familiarity with their child’s abilities.113  However, parents may 
have difficulty communicating with their child and/or have different ideas about 
important case decisions.  Several attorneys in the Tobey et al. study worried that 
parents’ own interests conflicted with their adolescents’ interests.114  For example, 
a parent may want their child to accept a plea bargain and admit guilt to teach them 
a lesson and have them learn from their experience.  The child and defense 
attorney, however, might prefer to go to court and fight the charges against her.  
Or, as Birckhead notes, many families have intra-family conflicts that result in or 
from poor parent-child relationships that may affect the attorney’s role.115  
Moreover, family members may be directly involved in a juvenile’s case as 
victims, witnesses, or in other roles.  In the absence of such conflicts though, 
Katner argues that attorneys should consult with parents, and that the Model Rules 
of Professional Responsibility should clarify parental roles in juvenile court.
116
  
Such clarification could include addressing the lack of privilege for parent-child 
communications, which may hinder true and effective parental consultation.
117
 
Whether parents’ legal knowledge can compensate for their children’s is an 
empirical question.  The authors of this review conducted a study examining 
parents and their children’s understanding of the role of defense attorneys and their 
understanding of concepts such as attorney-client privilege.  To do this, 170 
English-speaking, youth-parent dyads were recruited from communities in the 
Mid-Atlantic region.  Youths were ages 11–17, and primarily male and African 
American (64%).
118
  Parents or guardians were predominantly female (85%) and 
either African American (62%) or Caucasian (26%).  Families were recruited from 
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one of the ten metropolitan statistical areas with the largest population, which 
included an urban city and several associated counties.
119
  Because we were 
interested in how families generally understood juveniles’ rights and 
responsibilities in court irrespective of their own justice experience, we recruited 
families from the community, not from the justice system specifically.  Even so, 
about 18% of the parents, 22% of middle adolescents (ages 14–15), 39% of older 
adolescents (ages 16–17), and 3% of young adolescents (ages 11–13) reported 
justice system experience.  Among other measures, youth and their parents were 
assessed on their understanding of lawyers, including their advocacy role and 
confidentiality. 
Our results showed that parents might be able to compensate for their 
adolescent’s incorrect knowledge in some arenas but not others.  Almost 65% of 
parents believed that the lawyer’s most important role is doing what the parent 
wants; only 13% said what the child wants is most important.  This was true for 
parents both with and without justice system experience.  When asked who a court-
appointed lawyer works for, 93.5% of parents responded that the lawyer works for 
the child.  Similarly, 94% of parents believe the lawyer works for the child when 
the child themselves pays.  When parents hire the lawyer, however, 52.4% 
indicated the lawyer works for the parent; 41.8% said the lawyer works for the 
child, and again, these numbers are similar for parents with justice system 
experience.  Now it is possible that some of those parents were responding in a 
technical sense about employment and not in a substantive sense about whether the 
parent or child directs the lawyer’s actions.  However, 52% of parents believed the 
attorney should listen to them rather than their child if there was a family 
disagreement regarding proper course of action in the child’s case.  About 60% 
strongly agreed with the statement that young people should not have the right to 
act as their own lawyer.  
Parents also misunderstood the extent of attorney-client privilege.  For 
example, a substantial percentage of parents distinguished between themselves and 
other justice system stakeholders regarding the confidentiality of lawyer-youth 
conversations.  Half of parents believed that the lawyer can disclose information 
about their conversations with the child to the parent without the child’s 
permission.  About 30% of parents believed that the lawyer can disclose 
information without the child’s permission to the judge and the child’s probation 
officer.  Only 11% believed lawyers can do so with police.  Interestingly, having 
justice system experience did not increase the likelihood that parents had a better 
understanding of confidentiality and privilege.  For example, about 40% of parents 
with justice system experience believed the lawyer can disclose information about 
the lawyer-child conversations to the parent without the child’s permission.  
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Approximately 20% of parents with justice system experience believed the lawyer 
could disclose such information to the judge or the child’s probation officer.  Only 
about 13% of parents with justice system experience believed lawyers could do so 
with police.  We can see how these beliefs might influence parent-child 
conversations about important decisions. 
As a part of the interview, parents and youth each read separate descriptions 
of a hypothetical situation in which the police catch the youth stealing from a local 
store.  The parent and youth then came together and were videotaped while talking 
about what to do next.  After an initial vignette about police interrogation, a second 
vignette involved the youth’s court-appointed attorney indicating that the youth 
and the attorney should meet without the parent in the room.  The parent received 
the same description.  Then, parent and youth were videotaped talking about 
whether the youth should talk to the attorney without his or her parent.  One parent 
talked with her eleven-year-old son about it this way: 
 
Parent: Well I don’t want you to talk to the lawyer by yourself.  You’re 
only 11.  This is complicated.  I’m not a lawyer but I’m at least an adult.  
I think I can understand some of the consequences. 
 
Youth: I think I should talk to my lawyer. 
 
Parent: Why?  I mean yes, I agree you should talk to your lawyer but 
why without me?  
 
Youth: Well then I might say more if I’m without you.  And I might be 
more honest.  You might make me, I don’t know, nervous. 
 
Parent: So you’re worried that whatever you say in front of me, you’re 
going to have to pay for at home.  Well, whatever happens at home 
(name), you can live with that, that’s between us.  You’re not going to 
get hurt.  If you have consequences at home, those are private; those are 
not part of the court system. 
 
Youth: Then maybe should I talk to them about it? 
 
Parent: I want to be here because this is your future. I don’t want her . . . 
 
Youth: I already said . . . 
 
Parent: She might get you to say things . . . 
 
Youth: It was my opinion that we should talk, but I understand that, that, 
I mean, you want to be there, but I don’t know, I don’t know, I think I 
should, yeah. 
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Parent: You think you should talk to her by yourself? 
 
Youth: No, I think I should not talk to her by myself.  Okay, I won’t talk 
to her.  
 
Parent: This is just the most serious thing that’s ever happened to you 
and I think you need your parents by your side.  
 
Youth: Okay.  
 
From a developmental perspective, it is not unreasonable for a parent to be 
concerned about an 11-year old’s capacities to make informed judgments.  Another 
family with an older adolescent (16–17) reached the opposite conclusion:  
 
Parent: Okay now, we need to go down to the attorney’s office and the 
attorney wants to talk to you in the room without me, so I said that I am 
confident that you should tell the attorney everything.  If you stole 
something from Walmart, I’m not going to be in the room so you should 
open up and tell your lawyer everything, do you agree? 
 
Youth: Yes. 
 
Parent: You agree you should tell them everything? 
 
Youth: Yeah. 
 
Parent: About what happened? 
 
Youth: Yeah. 
 
Parent: Okay. So, I’m not going to be in the room so tell her everything 
that happened at Walmart that day.  And, um, that’s it, I guess.  
 
Afterwards, this adolescent marked “somewhat agree” to the statement “my parent 
gave me a chance to express my opinions and feelings.”  The parent reported 
trying to take her child’s needs into account and that her involvement made things 
easier for her child to understand; the youth responded similarly.  With very little 
discussion, it is difficult to discern the adolescent’s opinions as independent from 
the parent’s.  
Although this next youth and parent actually talked about the youth’s previous 
case instead of the vignette, they shared differing views about parental presence 
with the lawyer: 
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Parent: Now, I should be in the room when you talk with that lawyer.  
You remember what that lawyer did to you? 
 
Youth: The lawyer?  It was cool, I was like, like, she asked me if the 
lawyer, should I tell the lawyer everything about what happened, and 
then I was like yeah, I’ll tell her everything that happened. 
 
Parent: Without me being in the room? 
 
Youth: And I’ll tell you what happened too.  What, did you say you 
wanted to be in the room? 
 
Parent: I think I need to be in the room. 
 
Youth: Why? 
 
Parent: Because the lawyer can tell you, well, you know, you did this 
and slip, you know, how they did it last time.  You didn’t, you had a 
lawyer but he was slippery and being, well, “you need to do this.” 
 
Youth: My lawyer was cool last time.  
 
Parent: I don’t think so.  I think that’s why you got time.  
 
The parent then went on later to talk about the different information they were 
receiving from the lawyer and the youth: 
 
Parent: Yeah but I think I, if I had uh been there, and had uh, you know, 
and you and I both would have known what was said.  You were told one 
thing and I was told another.  Remember when we sit down and we was 
talking about that with the lawyer? 
 
Youth: We never sat with my lawyer.  I mean… 
 
Parent: Me and you both.  That’s why I said we needed to be together.  
Because things they told you I never knew.  And then when I found out 
that they were telling me one thing and he was telling me one thing and 
you was telling me another thing.  But I like to hear the case and the 
truth, which you and the lawyer and, you know, there, and then they say 
that in front of that lawyer I felt that I needed to be there with you.  You 
agree? 
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Youth: I’m still thinking like, I still think I could tell her like everything 
without you being in the room, because like you would eventually find 
out well, what happened.  
 
Parent: I don’t think I would find out everything. 
 
We do not know what happened in that youth’s previous case, but clearly that 
experience of hearing different stories affected the parent’s desire to be in the room 
when the lawyer and her child spoke.  The youth did not seem to feel there would 
be a problem meeting the lawyer without the parent because the parent would 
eventually find out, but the parent didn’t believe him.  These examples are not 
necessarily representative of families more generally or even the kinds of 
conversations that parents and youth might have; families were recruited from the 
community and participating in an interview study that required a degree of 
organization and family function.  However, they do provide insight into the types 
of interactions that might occur, or what parents and youth might have in mind as 
they come together to interact with an attorney. 
Acknowledging the broader legal and social framework in which parents have 
the rights and responsibilities for making decisions on behalf of their children, 
Fedders notes that attorneys may feel pressure to incorporate and respond to 
parents’ wishes, especially if they are hired by the parent (a view that our data 
suggest parents may hold as well).
120
  In interviews with defense attorneys, Tobey, 
Grisso & Schwartz found that often parent and adolescent interests were not 
aligned.
121
  Defense attorneys may also feel pressured to ensure parents are on 
board with their children’s decisions if those decisions might require parental 
involvement (e.g., parental engagement at the disposition phase).  Parental 
involvement laws may require that parents be held legally culpable for their 
children’s illegal behavior122 and may also allow the courts to require parents to 
pay restitution fees, attend the juvenile’s court hearings, and participate in social 
services for the family.  Of course, if a parent fails to comply, they may face 
additional fines or more serious consequences, such as jail time.
123
  With the 
presence of parent involvement laws, parents may experience a very real and direct 
legal consequence of their child’s case that could affect their input to their child’s 
decisions. 
These data suggest that parents may not always be effective advocates for 
their children, especially those parents who bring their own misunderstandings 
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about the attorney-client relationship to the table.  It is likely that parents suffer 
from some of the same procedural justice barriers that their adolescent children do 
and also misunderstand the attorney’s advocacy role and confidentiality rules.  
Particularly for parents of young clients, ceding decision making autonomy to their 
child may contradict all other aspect of parenting.  Certainly, some parents have a 
better understanding of their children’s rights, but these data suggest policymakers 
and juvenile defense attorneys should not assume all parents do.    
 
VI. QUANTITY OR QUALITY OF TIME WITH CLIENTS AS REMEDY?  
STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES 
 
Since Gault, commentators and researchers have examined whether one 
partial remedy for adolescents’ increased risk of impairment may be talking with 
their attorneys.
124
  Viljoen and Roesch examined 152 pretrial adolescents’ 
understanding and legal competence-relevant capacities, as well as legal learning 
opportunities.
125
  Compared with the 16–17 year olds, those 15 and younger with 
low intelligence scores were far more likely to have inadequate legal capacities.
126
  
However, youths who spent more time with their attorneys had better 
understanding.
127
  This was especially true for youths with lower cognitive 
abilities, which the authors explained as likely being due to those individuals 
having “greater room for improvement.”128  Their data provides preliminary (albeit 
not sufficient) evidence that support the notion that spending additional time with 
juvenile clients could improve juveniles’ capacities.  
Although teaching does appear to have some salutary effects, the limited 
research doesn’t suggest it can eliminate those age-based deficits.  Research has 
not examined whether the improvements from teaching alone are sustained over 
time and few studies assess whether juveniles can apply their understanding 
appropriately.
129
  Although better understanding could lead to better rapport 
between attorneys and their clients, it does not solve all developmental barriers to 
the attorney-client relationship.  A juvenile’s relationship to an attorney is probably 
unique among her experiences with other adults and difficult to grasp.
130
  
Compared to adults, adolescents’ psychosocial immaturity makes them more 
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suggestible to authority figures’ requests and recommendations and less able to 
weigh the long-term consequences of decisions made in emotionally salient 
contexts, especially when those decisions have positive and emotionally valuable 
immediate consequences (e.g., the difference between going home today on 
probation and having a record that could affect job prospects in five years).  
Attorneys need not only time to spend with juvenile clients but the capacities 
and skills to engage with them appropriately.  Compared to attorneys in criminal 
court, juvenile defense attorneys often have the least experience and, at least 
developmentally, more complicated clients.  The juvenile courts have been 
described as “training grounds” for recent law graduates who eventually will move 
on to the criminal courts
131
 where pay is potentially better,
132
 and the work more 
highly regarded.
133
  Moreover, standard legal training is insufficient; specific 
knowledge of adolescent development should be required.
134
  Understandably, 
scarce resources may not cover extra-legal training topics.  Unfortunately, a better 
understanding of adolescent development could indeed assist counsel with building 
rapport and with appropriately assessing issues such as understanding, 
acquiescence, and decision-making in their client.
135
 
High caseloads in juvenile defense may incentivize plea agreements, 
particularly for less serious cases, over quality representation.  Of particular 
concern is the fact that juvenile defense caseloads are never actually at the level the 
U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance recommends for quality representation (i.e., 
juvenile defense caseloads should not exceed 250 cases annually).
136
  According to 
Jones’ review of access to counsel,137 many states suffered from problematically 
high caseloads.  For example, Louisiana reported as many as 800 cases per year 
and Virginia reported a range of 679–1,500 cases for public defenders between 
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2000 and 2003.
138
  If the standards recommend caseloads not exceed 250 per year, 
numbers approaching 1,000 cases annually should raise concern regarding the 
quality and effectiveness of counsel.  Specifically, how much time is counsel able 
to devote to their juvenile clients to build rapport and develop trust, not to mention 
actually investigating their cases?  Moreover, Buss raises the possibility that, 
although the youth’s attorney is perhaps best positioned to facilitate her client’s 
true participation in court processes, the informal culture of the court values 
efficiency and going against standard procedure might (inappropriately) redound 
negatively to her client.
139
  
Structural policies could also hinder the relationship between attorneys and 
juvenile clients by limiting the amount of time they actually have to discuss the 
case facts and for the attorney to get to know the client.  Specifically, the time at 
which counsel is appointed can play a significant role in how effectively counsel 
can defend their client.  Access to counsel before pretrial detention is crucial for 
attorneys to be able to investigate and develop a proper course of action through 
consultation with their client, yet state reports suggest that many juvenile 
defendants are not provided with counsel until their first appearance in court.
140
  
This results in attorneys having insufficient preparation time to familiarize 
themselves with the case and their client and often only meeting with their client 
for several minutes before any real decisions need to be made.  This is obviously a 
concerning practice for any defendant, but is particularly concerning for juvenile 
defendants who require additional consultation time when decisions have to be 
made. 
Taken together, structural barriers in juvenile defense create severe time 
constraints which directly affects the ability for attorneys to develop any rapport 
with their client, correct misunderstandings, build trust, and investigate the case 
sufficiently to provide effective quality legal representation.  States’ high annual 
caseloads are enough to raise concern.  However, for those states who are not 
struggling with problematically high caseloads, there is still the issue of 
insufficient training in general, not to mention a lack of emphasis on juvenile-
specific legal training.  The fact that juvenile defense is often underappreciated and 
results in lower pay means the incentive to remain in juvenile defense for long 
periods of time is low.
141
  This further aggravates the training issue such that those 
within juvenile defense who might train others are possibly inexperienced 
themselves.  Finally, when policies do not exist to ensure attorneys are assigned to 
their clients early on (e.g., before pre-trial detention), it will always be difficult to 
dedicate a sufficient amount of time to building rapport and trust with a juvenile 
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client, which ultimately puts juveniles at a disadvantage and at risk for inadequate 
representation. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The research suggests that younger adolescents in particular are not likely to 
have the capacities needed to be successful legal actors who can engage in an 
effective attorney-client relationship.  Adolescents are more likely than adults to 
acquiesce to the requests of authority figures; they are also more myopic than 
adults when considering the consequences of their actions, valuing short-term 
consequences over long-term ones.  Compared to adults, juveniles are more likely 
to misunderstand the rules to which defense attorneys must adhere, and perhaps 
less likely to trust their attorneys, in part for developmental reasons, not just 
experience or individual differences.
142
  Some of the research reviewed suggests 
that as age increases so does the understanding of the roles of defense attorneys 
and the rules they must adhere to.  However, the same evidence suggests that even 
older adolescents struggle with understanding the advocacy role and 
confidentiality rules attorneys must abide by.  Likewise, parents may not be 
equipped with the information to assist their youth in working with an attorney, or 
may have beliefs and ideas that the attorney (or the youth) think are not in the 
youth’s best interests.  The research reported here represents some of the only data 
examining parent and child conversations about the role of parents in the attorney-
juvenile client relationship.  We found that parents’ and youths’ views about the 
parental role are varied and potentially contradictory.  Although differing views 
between parents and youth are not inherently negative, these data suggest that 
attorneys may need to address a lack of information, misinformation, and 
disagreements among their youthful clients and their clients’ parents.  It is 
possible, but not guaranteed, that greater resources for the attorney and the family 
might scaffold their capacities enough to improve the attorney-client relationship 
and therefore the quality of defense representation and advocacy.
143
  It would be 
worth finding out. 
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